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THIs is the most frequent phase of the preternatural
with which courts of law have had to deal. There are two
distinct classes of cases: First, those in which the testator's
belief is not shown to have had any influence upon the disposition of his property; second, those in which that belief
either can be directly proven to have influenced him in the
making of his will, or in which circumstances point with
irresistible force to that conclusion.
The first class falls
within the operation df the rule laid down by C. J. CocKBURN in Banks v. Goodfellow,' that where the mind of a
testator is affected by an insane delusion, but it does not
appear that that delusion had any influence upon him in
' 5 L. R. Q. B., 549 (1870). It may be worth noting that in that case
one of the two delusions under which the testator labored was that spirits
were pursuing him.
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regard to the disposition of his property, his testamentary
capacity cannot be said to be impaired by the delusion, and
his will is to be held valid. This is now the accepted rule
in both England and America; and in order* to raise the
question of delusion, it must first be shown that the belief
of the testator had an influence upon his will; or, if not,
and evidence of his belief be already given, it will be
stricken out.'
In regard to the second class of cases, the question is
twofold. First, is a belief in the preternatural in any of its
phases an insane delusion? and second, does such a belief
exert so controlling an influence over the mind of a testator
as to amount to an undue influence? The first question
may be considered as finally settled in the negative, in
spite of the many plausible and even cogent arguments to
the contrary that have been advanced. No religious belief,
or belief in any form of the preternatural, however monstrous or perverted it may appear to us, is, of itself alone,
an insane delusion in the eye of the law.2 Accordingly, it
has been held that a belief in the transmigration of souls,3
in the hopeless damnation of one's own soul,4 in purgatory, 5
in a peculiar compensatory relation between conduct on this
earth and the assignment of rewards and. punishments in
the world to come,6 in witchcraft,' and in spiritualism, 8 are
I La Bau v. Vanderbilt, 3 Redf. (N. Y.), 384 (877).
2Denson v. Beazley, 34 Tex., 191 (1871). "If the true test of the absence or presence of insanity is the absence or presence of delusion, then
insanity and delusion become the same thing; or at least are no more
than different terms used to designate the same condition of mind. Tried
by such a metaphysical or psychological test, Emanuel Swedenborg,
John Wesley, Martin Luther, Joan of Arc, Joseph Addison, and the author
of Rasselas, Napoleon Bonaparte, and hundreds more of the greatest and
soundest minds which ever existed on eartk, must be declared insane.
For each of these stoutly maintained what men of the present day would
declare delusions."
3 Bonard's Will, i6 Abb. Pr. N. S. (N. Y.), 128.
4Weir's Will, 9 Dana. (Ky.), 434.
' Newton v. Carbery, 5 Cranch, C. Ct., 626.
6Gass v. Gass, 2 Humph. (Tenn.), 278.
1 Van Guysling v. Van Kuren, 35 N. Y., 70.
s Otto v. Doty, 61 Iowa, 23; Turner v. Hand, 3 Wall, Jr., 88; Continental Ins. Co. v. Delpeuch, 82 Pa., 225.

TEST4MENTARY DISPOSITIONS.

not insane delusions. The reasons for this ruling, briefly
stated, are the following: In the first place, the belief in
the preternatural seems to be an essential part of man's
nature; and.while this is mainly true of what are properly
called religious beliefs, yet it renders him prone to fall into
the grosser forms of superstition and idolatry, to which
witchcraft and the phenomena of spiritualism ate closely
akin. Childhood is especially liable to be imposed upon in
this way; and the impressions then received often become
so firmly rooted as to be ineradicable by the light of reason
in after years.1 These beliefs have been prevalent at all
times in the history of mankind and among men in all conditions of life. "If ever there was a doctrine of which it
could be said that it was held semnier, zibique, el ab omnibus,

this is one." 2 As it is one of the essentials of an insane
delusion that the mind of the person possessed by it should
be completely under its control, the fact that this special
form of belief does not incapacitate those who hold it from
managing their own affairs with success has been held to be
a strong proof that they were not under the influence of an
insane delusion; 3 and it is another essential of an insane
' Leech v. Leech, i Phila., 224; Thompson v. Quimby, 2 Bradf.
(N. Y.), 449; In re Vedder, 14 N. Y. State Repr., 470.
2 Thompson v. Quimby, sufi-a. "From the visits of the angel to
Lot, and others of the patriarchs (without referring to the-scenes in the
garden of Eden), down to this time when the spirits, like Poe's stately
midnight raven, come gently rapping, rapping at the chamber doors of
modern mediums, some of whom are eminent persons, the world, Pagan,
Jewish and Christian, have, to a greater or less extent, believed in spiritual existences, some being good and some evil, which have maintained a
connection with, and manifested their powers through human beings-in the case of the witch of Endor to even raising the dead."
3 Lee v. Lee, 4 McCord (S. C.), 183. When the testator was a man of
strong belief in the pretended communications of mediums, but readily
abandoned his belief in them when it could be demonstrated to him that
they were in the wrong, his belief was held no delusion. Chafin Will
Case, 32 Wis., 557- So, also, where the testator was a man of intense
faith in his own judgment, and subjected everything to its test, so that,
although a firm believer in spiritualism, he came, in the words of one
witness, to believe "that there were more than one kind of spirits-some
might try to fool him, and others might not," there could be no delusion.
Will of J. B. Smith, 52 Wis., 543.
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delusion that it does not rest on any basis of fact, and is
not the result of any process of reasoning, these beliefs,
which (even the impostures of spiritualism), depend to s6me
extent upon the evidence of the senses, however deceived,
cannot be held delusions. They may be due to imposition,
deception, ignorance of common scientific phenomena, or
to a wholly perverted train of reasoning; but they cannot
be said to be delusions. It cannot be expected that all
men should understand the phenomena of even every-day
experience in the same light, or should be able to carry out
a faultless chain of logical reasoning to its correct results,
in regard to all the matters which may fall within their observation. To a mind already predisposed in a particular
direction, facts invariably take on a very different aspect
from that in which they will appear to one who is without
that bias; and there is no phase of human experience
in which the truth of this is more clearly shown than in
this very matter of preternatural belief. It would scarcely
be an exaggeration to say that in the service of the Evil
One himself there have not been the enormities perpetrated
that have been done openly under the cloak of religion, by
those who there is every reason to suppose honestly believed that they were "doing God service." It is also
true that the opportunities for education and cultivation possessed by men are widely different; and there can
be no hard and fast rule applied, by which to judge of the
mental state of all mankind. The ignorant and superstitious may well be pardoned for firmly believing that which
to the educated man seems the most puerile folly; and it
there is the least foundation in apparent facts for that belief,
it cannot be held to be an insane delusion.1
But the strongest argument of all is, that it is utterly
impossible to have any certain criteria of the truth of most,
if not all, preternatural beliefs; that we cannot say with
positiveness that one who differs with us on any tenet, or
who holds a peculiar doctrine which may seem to us wholly
'Middleditch

v. Williams, 45 N. J. Eq.,

725.
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irrational and destitute of foundation, is therefore wrong,
and if he persists in his belief, of unsound mind. It is, of
course, perfectly patent that if the other man were asked
his opinion, he would declare that we, and not he, were the
insane. The general consensus, of belief certainly counts
for something; but it can hardly avail to prove insanity in
one who differs with it. Otherwise, many of the best and
greatest of the world's benefactors-those who have brought
about the greatest reforms and have given the most powerful impulse to our onward progress, would be reckoned
insane. Delusion in its legal sense cannot be predicated of
speculative beliefs. 1
This conclusion is strongly combatted by Justice
CLERKE, in a dissenting opinion, in Thompson v. Thompson;' but ineffectually, although there would seem to have
been strong reasons in some of the cases, for holding that
the testator was insane.' Judge REDFIELD also,4 argues
very vigorously against the accepted doctrine; but his argument begs the question, and proceeds upon the assumption
that there is no evidence to support the belief in the manifestations of spiritualism: whereas it is beyond question
that there is such evidence, however weak and unconvincing to the legal or the logical mind. The mistake of the
learned judge is, that he applies the same test to all mankind that he would apply to himself; while it has been
shown that regard must be had to the circumstances of the
testator, his early training, his education, his means of enlightenment, and all the influences to which he has been
exposed.
But although these beliefs are not per se insane delusions, they may, when taken in connection with other circumstances, amount to such.' This is especially the case
where the belief of the testator has acquired such a domiI Gass v. Gass, supra. In re Keeler's Vill, 3 N. Y. S, 629.
2 21

Barb. (N. Y.), 107.

3 See Lee v. Lee, supra; Kelly v. Miller, 39 Mriss., 17.

In his American Cases on the Law of Wills, ist Ed., 3 84.
,'Thompson v. Quimby, supra; Lee v. Lee, sufra; Robinson v.
Adams, 62 Maine, 369.
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nation over his mind that he is not left to the free and uncontrolled exercise of his own will, at least so far as that
belief is concerned.' It is not, however, a question of law,
but one of'fact for the jury, under proper instructions.'
Such beliefs may also give rise to insane delusions in'regard
to the proper objects of the tgstator' s bounty, in which case
the ordinary, rules of law apply; but the mere fact that the
testator expresses a belief that his relatives,' or his daughters,' or even his wife,5 are witches or bewitched, does not
of itself prove such delusion in regard to them as will justify a court in setting aside his will.6 There can be no
doubt, however, that in a clear case the courts would not
hesitate to set a will aside on this ground.
In discussing the question of undue influence, we must
again distinguish two classes of cases: First, those in which
a spiritual adviser or professed medium has procured a benefit for himself or some third person, either by directly fostering or playing upon the preternatural beliefs of the testator, or merely by virtue of the general influence which
belongs to him in consequence of the relation which he
bears to the latter; and second, those in which the beliefs
of the testator have so worked upon his mind, without the
apparent active intervention of a spiritual advisor or medium, or, so to speak, the spirits seem to have so exercised
their influence directly upon him, as to produce the will in
question. The former class are on all fours with Lyon v.
Home, discussed. in a previous number of this magazine,'
and are decided upon analogous principles. "There are
certain cases in which the law indulges in the presumption
that undue influence has been used, and those cases are
I Woodbury v. Obear, 7 Gray (Mass.), 467; Stanton v. Wetherwax,
16 Barb. (N. Y.), 239.
2Gass v. Gass, sufira; William's Zx'r v. Williams, 13 S.W. (Ky.), 250.
8 Lee v. Lee, sufira.
I Addington V. Wilson, 5 Ind., 137.
5
Johnson v. Johnson, io Ind., 387.
6 Schildnecht v. Rompf, 4 S. W., (Ky.), 235.
16 L. R. Eq., 655.
S Aug., 1892, Vol. 31, P. 505.
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where a patient makes a will in favor of his physician, a
client in favor of his lawyer, a ward in favor of his guardian,
or any person in favor of his priest or religious advisor, or
where other close confidential relationships exist. Such
wills, *.hen made to the exclusion of the natural objects of
the testator's bounty, are viewed with great suspicion by
the law, and some proof should be required beside the factum
of the will before the will can be sustained."' In Thompson v. Hawks,2 the defendant was a spirit medium, and the
testator, who was very much interested in spiritualism,
made frequent visits to her house, for the purpose of communicating with the spirits. She undertook to "develop"
him, and enable him to communicate directly with the
spirits of the dead. She did develop him with such success that she persuaded him to convey his real estate to her
for a consideration of the payment of which there was no
evidence except her own statement. About two years later
she reconveyed this property to him, taking his notes in
part payment; but in the interval between the two conveyances the testator had made his will, leaving her all his
property, to the exclusion of his son, his only child. Both
before and after the conveyance to Mrs. Hawks, and the
execution of his will, the testator informed several persons
that he had been directed by the spirit of his deceased wives,
through Mrs. Hawks, to dispose of his property; that he
had been advised by them that it was necessary for his development to do so; and that he had received various warnings against his son, and injunctions to "do well by" Mrs.
Hawks, from the same source. The Court held that the
will was clearly the result of undue influence, and therefore void. "The testator was in a weakened state of mind
when he came under the influence of a spirit medium. He
embraced spiritualism as practiced by the spirit medium,
and instead of merely believing in it as an abstract proposition, he became possessed by it, and suffered it to dominate his life and override every other consideration. His
1 Marx v. McGlynn, 88 N. Y., 35714 Fed. Rep., 902.
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belief in it was artfully used by the spirit medium-the only
one, it appears, whom he ever consulted-to alienate him
from his ouly son and child, and to get his property. A
will made in such a mental condition and under such influences ought to be set aside."
In Baylies v. Spaulding,1 the testator .was eighty years
old at the time of hit second marriage, which was to a woman who had been his housekeeper for over twelve years
previous to the marriage. He was a believer in spiritualism; and his daughter's testimony went to show that she
and her father had frequently consulted with Mrs. Blake
(the second wife) before she came to be the testator's housekeeper; that the testator would go to sittings presided over
by her, thinking that he had communications from his first
wife; that Mrs. Blake had said that she would never marry
witness's father, but that after coming to live with him as
housekeeper she obtained great influence over him; and
that the day of his second marriage the testator sat down
and cried and said that he did not want to be married.
Other witnesses gave evidence tending to show that the
second wife had great influence over the testator. It was
claimed that in view of these facts, although the testator
was admittedly a man of strong, clear mind and strong will,
he was influenced to make his will by means of the control
which his second wife had obtained over him by her pretences that she was a medium and had communications
from his first wife; and it was held that there was evidence
from which the jury could reasonably infer that the alleged
will was procured to be made through the undue influence
and fraud of the second wife,
Of course, there are cases where a will is drawn in favor
of a spiritual adviser, or a medium, and yet it will be allowed to stand.
"The presumption of undue influence
which arises in such cases is a presumption of fact. There
is no statute which prohibits such a will. If fairly made
the law does not condemn it." ' But in these, just as in
Ii

New Eng. Rep., 914.
v. McGlynn, sufira.

2Marx
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the case of transfers of property made during life, the burden
of proof is on the spiritual adviser or medium to show, not
only that the transaction is wholly free from any suspicion
of underhand dealing or exertion of undue influence on his
part, but that it is also wholly unaffected by his relation to
the testator; and if he cannot show this to a reasonable certainty, the will will be set aside. The mere fact of the
belief of a testator in spiritualism, if that belief appears to
have in any appreciable degree affected the provisions of the
will, creates, just as in the case of any other religious belief,
a presumption of the exercise of undue influence 'by the
medium, and throws the burden of proof on him to rebut
that presumption. It is true that it was held in Figueira
v. Taafe,1 by the Surrogate, following in re Martin,' that
the mere fact that the legatee of a residuary estate, to the
exclusion of the sisters of the testatrix, was the spiritual
adviser of the latter, was not. enough to establish undue
influence, but that it must be affirmatively proved. The
authority of this case is not very strong, however, when it
is considered that it is not only opposed to the uniform current of decision in other courts, but is also at variance with
the decision of the Court of Appeals of the same State in
Marx v. McGlynn, supra.
The undue influence which will avoid a will, moreover,
must be such as constrains the will of the testator and does
not allow him to follow his own inclinations. The presumption of this constraint, therefore, vanishes when it can
be shown, either that the testator did in fact follow his own
wishes, or that the relation between the testator and the
spiritual adviser was not such as to create a controlling influence. In Lyons v. Campbell' the testatrix had made a
will in 1862, bequeathing to Bishop Lay, who was then
the rector of the church in which she was a communicant,
and his wife and children, over $1oo,ooo.
The bishop
left the State shortly thereafter, and during an absence of
'6 Dem. Sur., 166.
293

N. Y., 198.

88 Ala., 462.
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about twenty years did not visit her more than once. "In
1884 she made another will, by which she cut these bequests down to $40, ooo. Under these circumstances the
Court very properly held that all presumption of improper
influence was removed. A fortiori there can be no presumption of undue influence, where the legatee, although a
priest of the religious body to which the testator belonged,
is not shown to have ever had any religious conversations
with him, or to have assumed any professional relation to
him either before or after his conversion, or to have been
in any way instrumental in effecting that conversion; for
under such circumstances the priest cannot be said to have
been the spiritual adviser of the testator, and therefore no
presumption of undue influence can arise.1
It is also an important question whether or not the
will was drawn and executed under the supervision of the
spiritual adviser; and this will explain most of the apparent
inconsistencies in the decisions. Where the spiritual adviser draws up the will himself, or has it drawn up, and is
present at its execution, the presumption of undue influence
is, of course, strongest. But when the will is drawn up by
another, at the direction of the testator, and executed in
the absence of the spiritual adviser, the presumption is
correspondingly weak; and in such cases it may well be
held that some extraneous proof of undue influence is necessary in order to set aside the will.'
The rules laid down above in regard to a spiritual adviser would unquestionably apply to any one, not a professional religious adviser or medium, who procures for
himself a testamentary provision by fostering or playing
upon the superstitious fears or beliefs of another; with this
qualification, that because the beneficiary does not hold a
strictly professional or confidential relation to the testator,
there can be no presumption of undue influence arising
from that relation, but the case must depend upon the state of
facts proven. In Brooke v. Townsend it was proved that
N. Y. S., 842.
See Figueira v. Taafe, supra; Merrill v. Rolston, 3 Redf. (N.
37 Gill., io.
1 Bartholick's Will, 5
2

Y.), 220.
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the testator was under the conviction that he had at various
times had a sight of and conversation with the Almighty;
that he had peculiar notions upon the subject of eternal
punishment; and that he supposed himself directed in a
supernatural manner to manumit his negroes, and labored
under a religious delusion with respect to both them and
his property. By his will he freed his negroes and left all
his property to them. There was a very strong suspicion,
if not amounting to a certainty, that the will was due to
the superstitions of the testator, fostered by the negroes;
and it was set aside.
The same rule would certainly apply to cases in which
a third person had made use of the venality of the spiritual
adviser or the medium to procure himself a benefit through
the influence of the latter over the testator. It goes without
saying that the moral character of the influence thus exerted would be no higher (if anything a little lower) than
when the adviser or medium secures the benefit for himself.
There is small need of argument to support the position.
The feeling of the courts on the subject may be readily inferred from the language used in Greenwood v. Cline,1
where there was "an evident attempt by means of these
pretended spiritual communications to produce an improper
impression upon the mind of the testatrix in regard to her
son."
It is not necessary that there should be any proof or
any suspicion of venality. It is enough if the influence .of
the spiritual adviser was strong enough to control the mind
of the testator imn the execution of the will. In Carroll v.
House2 the testator had been repeatedly urged by his sister
to make a will; but he had always refused to do so, until
on his death-bed. Then being told by the priest, who was
his spiritual adviser, that it would be better for him to
make one, or there would be litigation after his death, he
yielded, and a testamentary paper was drawn up by the
priest. By this he left all his property to his sister, to the
'

7 Or., 17.
22 At., x91.
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exclusion of his grandchild, the daughter of his only child,
his brother and his nephew. In this state of facts the Viceordinary, VAN FLEET, very properly held that the will
could not stand, but should be set aside on the ground of
undue influence.'

Again, it is not necessary that the benefit to be gained
from the will by the person who exerts the undue influence
should be direct and immediate; it is enough if there is a
likelihood of some remote and contingent benefit to accrue,
provided that the contingency is not too remote. An example of such a contingent benefit would be a promise by
the expectant legatee to a spiritual adviser or medium that
he would reward him if he succeeded in obtaining a testamentary provision in his favor. But the probability of
future benefit may be much more remote; it may depend
upon a presumption only. Just as the law creates the
presumption of undue influence as attendant upon certain
relations, so it will create in a proper case a presumption
that the adviser will be probably benefited by the disposiI"It is clear that the paper under consideration is the product of
undue influence. Left to himself, it is manifest that the decedent would
have died intestate. He did not want to make a will. When he was
first advised by his priest to make a will he refused, or deferred doing so
until another time. But now he is told he is about to die; he believed
he was in the grasp of death; he is also told that it will be better for him
to make a will, and that if he does not litigation will follow his death.
Those words come to him from his spiritual adviser; from the man to
whom he had committed the welfare of his soul, and in whom he reposed
the highest and holiest trust that it is possible for one human being to
repose in another. Spoken by such a person, at such a time, they were
invested with all the coercive force that words can ever have. To the
decedent their force was irresistible. They not only subdued and broke
his will, but put his recollection in a state of chaos. They made him
forget his grandchild, his brother and his nephew. He said he had no
relatives in this country except a sister. The words possessing the
greatest force were false. The priest had no warrant whatever for declaring that if the decedent did not make a will there would be litigation
after his death. No matter with what motive, or for what purpose this declaration was made, there can be no doubt that, though entirely false, it
operated as a powerful appeal to the fears of the decedent, and coupled
as it was with the advice of his priest that it was better for him to make
a will, that it constrained him to do what he did not want to do, and
what he would not have done if left to himself."
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tion which he has advised, even where he is not shown to
have controlled the will of the testator. Thus where a
person holding the relation of spiritual adviser to the
testator procures a will to be drawn, and supervises its
execution, by which a church in which he is interested is
benefited, that relation to the testator, reinforced by the
relation in which he stands to the church, creates vi iiso,
a presumption of undue influence which throws the burden
of proof on him to show that the will is the result of the
spontaneous volition of the testator.' The same holds good
with respect to one not strictly a spiritual adviser. In
Drake's Appeal' the testator, by a will made five days
before his death, while he was suffering from a severe
disease, left the bulk of his estate to a church in the town
where he lived. This will was drawn by a vestryman of
the church, who was also made sole executor, and who was
the only one who ever conversed with him on the subject.
This vestryman was deeply interested in the welfare of the
church, and was a liberal contributor to its support. He,
another vestryman, and his brother-in-law, were the three
witnesses to the will, in which certain of the testator's relations were misdescribed. It was held that these circumstances were sufficient to create a suspicion of undue influence, which did not require direct proof, and threw the
burden of explanation on the propounders of the will.
In the second class of cases, however, in which there
is no presumption of undue influence arising from the relation of the legatee to the testator, it is the rule of the courts
that such influence must be shown affirmatively; and that
it is not enough to show that the will was in fact to some
degree the offspring of the belief of the testator, or of the
alleged communication of the spirits. The leading case on
this branch of the subject is Robinson v. Adams,' where
there was no evidence of any attempt by any one to influence the mind of the testatrix, except the communicatiors
I Welsh's Will,
2 45 Conn., 9.
62 laine, 407.

i Redf. (N. Y.), 238.

BELIEF IN THE PRETERNATURAL.

ftom the spirits. The question of delusion was raised in
this case also, and the two are not very clearly distinguished
in the opinion. But the substance of the decision is, that
while it is possible for one to come so under the influenceof such communications as to lose one's own free will, yet
they may be regarded by the testator as merely advice; that
the same rule should be applied to such cases as to the suggestions of .livingbeings, and that the true criterion is, whether these communications are considered by the testator as
advice which he is at liberty to follow or not as he pleases,
or as commands which he is bound to obey.1
In Storey's Will 2 there were no strong proofs to show
that the belief of the testator in the pretended communications which were obtained for hiul from a spirit known as
" ' If she was of sound mind generally, and if no living person did
unduly influence her, yet she may have been under the control and dictation
of what she believed was the spirit of her deceased husband, communicating to her strictly through a medium; and that to her it was a reality;
and that her own will was subordinated to her husband's will, and. that
will was his and not her's. It is contended that this was a delusion, and
an undue and improper influence. On this point I give you the same rule
as before stated. If she did thus believe, and if she did have what she
deemed direct communications on the subject of this will, and implicitly
followed them, yielding her own will and judgment and exercising no
free agency (as before explained), then it would not be her will, but another's, in the same manner as if actually dictated by a livingperson. But
if she did thus believe, and had what she deemed her husband's opinions,
wishes or judgment, if she nevertheless acted her own will and her own
judgment, as before explained, and did not abandon both to the supposed
wishes and opinions of her husband, then it would not be undue influence, although she might have had full faith in the supposed communications, and have regarded them as her husband's advice. I give you the
same rule, in short, as I gave you as to living persons.' There is no doubt
that the law allows any person to seek advice, suggestions and opinions
from others, where no fraud or deception is practised. The law does not
limit the range. If a pious man ofsound mind should seek advice by prayer,
and should believe that he had a direct answer and should regard it, not
as dictation, but advice entitled to consideration, would any one say that
his will would be set aside as made under undue influence ?.....
If they (the spirit communications) dictated the will, it was void. If
they influenced the mind, but did not control it in making the will, or any
part of it, then the will would not be by them invalidated on the ground
of undue influence."
2 20 Ill. App., 183
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"Little Squaw" had an influence upon him in making his
will ; but the medium who procured him these communications was a sister of his wife, who was the principal legatee;
and it was proved that when the will was taken to the testator's house to be signed, his wife said to him, "Now,
Wilbur, sign this. You know what the little squaw has said
about making provision for those you love best; and you
know I love you, and you know you love me best ;" whereupon the testator took up a pen and signed the will. This
should have been enough to set the Court on its guard; but
the question of undue influence is barely touched upon in
the opinion, and the will was upheld.
The general question was again thoroughly discussed
in Middleditch v. Williams.1 In that case the testator was
at first a disbeliever in the pretensions of spiritualism ; and
it was not until after having attended several seances, at the
last of which the spirits gave wvhat seemed to him convincing evidence of their power, that he became their votary.
This was the printing, in brilliant letters, on a pin that his
mother-in-law wore on her neck, the pet name of his dead
wife. There was proof that he had stated to several persons that the spirit of his deceased wife had requested him,
through a medium, to make provision in his will for his
mother-in-law; and to another, that the spirit was constantly
urging him to make a will in favor of her mother. The
will did secure great advantages in firasenlito the mother,
and greater contingent advantages to her son, to the serious
disadvantage of the only daughter of the testator. But
the will was held valid, on the ground that there was not
sufficient competent evidence before the Court to prove undue influence. 2
'45 N. J.[Eq., 726.
2There was evidence of very improper and suspicious conduct by the
mother-in-law towards the relatives of the testator on the day of the wife's
funeral ; and at the time of the testator's death. She not only did not
send notice of his death to them, but did all she could to conceal it
from them. The decision of the Vice-Ordinary is very strongly attacked
by Mr. George H. Yeaman, in the Alb. L. J., vol. 40, P. 384. He admits
the truth of the principles on which the decision rests, but condemns the
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The true basis of the decision is that under the law of
New Jersey the declarations of a testator that he has been
unduly influenced in making his will are not receivable to
impeach it ; and these declarations were the only direct evidence of undue influence in the case. But the rule is a
questionable one in some respects; in the case in hand it
led to a manifestly unjust result; and such evidence is received by other courts.1 But even without that there would
seem to have been enough suspicious circumstances to have
justified the Court in setting aside the will; in particular,
the fact that the spirits convinced the testator through
the mother-in-law's pin; and the injustice of a will is held
to aid in creating a presumption of undue influence.2
The question whether the influence of the spirits is ber
se undue has never yet been raised independently of other
considerations. It is true that it was held in Newton v.
Carbery, 3 that the general doctrines of a church are not
undue influence sufficient to avoid a will; and there is a
dictum in Brown v. Ward' to the effect that the supposed
result deduced from them, and argues that not enough weight was given
to the other considerations in the case, nor to the plain facts. "Law, in
seeking to ascertain facts, for the purpose of basing judgments on those
facts, must keep within the domain of verifiable human knowledge.
Here the leading fact, well enough established, is that the testator believed in spiritualism and made his will under what he supposed a communication from the spirit of his dead wife. The mildest thing that can
be said of spiritualism is that it is not known to be true, and cannot be
proved to be true. Therefore a will that comes into Court out of the spiritual world does not come with the verifiable safe-guards required by the
law.........
The real question is, not whether spiritualism is true,
or whether believing in it is an insane delusion. It is whether a will made
under its influence is a real will, or a safe thing for the world as we know
it .........
Is spiritualism, in any view of it, a part of the practical
realities of this life, as we know them ; a basis for ethics, for family settlements, for testamentary dispositions ? Does not the question remain as
heretofore, was it his will? If the testator says that he was thus influenced,
what more do we want? If he was mistaken in thinking his will was dictated by the spirit of his dead wife, not to say defrauded into so believing,
ought it not to be rejected? And if in fact dictated by her, ought it not
equally to be rejected? It was not his will."
I Thompson v. Hawks, suira.
2In re Blair's Will, 16 N. Y. Suppl., 874.
35 Cranch C. Ct., 626.
4 53 Md., 375.
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directions of her ancestors, given to a woman who is a firm
believer in spiritualism, do not constitute undue influence,
though the question was not raised or discussed by counsel.
But it is doubtful whether the spiritualists can be properly
classed as a "church," and whether the dictum aforesaid is
correct. The nature of the influence of the spirits has
never been fully invrestigated by the courts. It has been
either tacitly or expressly assumed that it is in all respects
similar to that of human beings, to be treated by the same
rules and regarded as mere advice, or as undue influence,
according to the relation of the medium to the testator, or
the benefit derived; that where the medium did not appear
to have used his power for his own emolument, or that of
any other person, the influence must be held proper, unless
it could be proved to have controlled the mind of the testator. This seems to rest on a misapprehension. The presumption of undue influence is created by the law for the
benefit of the heir, the expectant object of the testator's
bounty, not to punish the one who exerts the improper influence. If a testator were to die without heirs, and there
would consequently be no one who could show a present interest in having the will set aside, there would be no cause
for setting it aside, no matter what the influence brought to
bear upon the testator. Even if the State were to set up a
claim of escheat, it would not be entertained. Therefore,
since, as was said, an unnatural or unjust will is an indication of undue influence,1 and the interest of the heir, not
the rebuking of the improper influence, is the basis of the
action of the Court, there would seem to be no valid reason
for making any distinction between influences which alike
tend to affect that interest injuriously-no reason for holding that a minister who procures a legacy for a church in
which he is interested should be held to have exercised
undue influence, but the medium, or the spirit, if you
choose, who has been the cause of a testamentary disposition in favor of any person or institution, to the injury of
IBlair's Will,
38

su/'ra.
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the heir's expectations, should be considered as having
exerted a legal influence. Where the results are alike, the
influences should be considered as falling under the same
ban.
Again, the point urged in some cases, that there is
reason to suppose that the testator looked upon the communications of the spirits as simply advice, which he was
at liberty to follow or not as he pleased, is flatly contradicted by the whole experience of mankind. There may
be some rare cases where a man or woman, while firmly
believing in the doctrines and phenomena of spiritualism,
at the same time refuses to grant them more than a mental
belief, and retains complete dominion over his own will and
judgment;' but in the vast majority of cases this belief
acquires such control over the mind of its votaries as to
make them its servants, if not its slaves. The same is true
of most religious beliefs, whether orthodox or not; and the
only reason for countenancing wills made under the influence of such beliefs is the general propriety of their pro.visions. An influence which leads to proper results certainly
cannot be called undue. But it is a distinguishing mark of
wills induced by a belief in spiritualism that their provisions
are not in accord with our ideas of propriety. It is claimed,
therefore, that where the ideas of the spirits clash with
2
ours, those of the spirits should be set aside.
'As seems to have been the case in Smith's will, supra.
2Judge Redfleld, in the work cited above, presents this phase of the
argument against spirit influence with great force: "The believers in
such revelations commonly, if not always, feel themselves entirely
incapable of going counter to their dictation. In this respect they are
in exactly the position of the insane, who believe themselves under the
influence of spirits. They become, either willingly or unwillingly, commonly the former, the complete slaves of such influence. Can it, then,
fairly be submitted to an ordinary jury to find whether souls, still bound
by terrestrial influences, will be capable of weighing with discretion and
impartiality the exact deference to be justly given to the messages from
the heavenly world? . . . . The law, which has no capacity and no
instruments or machinery for dealing with such subjects, except in a
common-sense and practical manner, is compelled to judge, by the fruits,
of the nature and source of the influence. We are assured by a high
authority that a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a
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There remains still the question, which does not appear
to have been raised separately in any of the reported cases,
whether, granting, for the sake of the argument, that these
influences are proper and fit for a court of justice to recognize and exercise no undue domination over the mind of a
testator which interferes with his free will, they are not,
nevertheless, to be treated as a fraud upon him, and whether
a will executed under their influence should not be set aside
as not the will of the testator. There can be no question
that a will procured by false pretences would be set aside,
just as certainly as a conveyance during life procured by the
same means; and if it can be shown that these pretended
spiritual communications and manifestations are false and
fraudulent, a will which is induced by them should certainly
be set aside also. It is a very strong argument in favor -of
this view that there is no positive or even presumptive
evidence of the truth of the claims of spiritualism. Evidence enough there is of a certain kind; but that by no
means convincing to a mind accustomed to scientific
methods of investigation. Then, on the other hand, the
precautions taken by the mediums to have their seances as
secret as possible; the pains they take to elude all investigation; the fact that most, if not all, of their performances
can be duplicated and even improved upon by those who
disclaim all preternatural powers and depend for their success simply upon their dexterity and sleight of hand; and
the fact (proved by the almost daily exposures of the frauds
practised by spiritualists) that the spirits, whenever we can
get hold of them, are flesh and blood as we are, and pass
current among us for ordinary men and women; all point
with tremendous force, strong almost to the point of absolute conviction, to the conclusion that all these pretensions
are in reality nothingbut frauds, and shouldbe treated as such.
corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. We must conclude, therefore, that an
influence proceeding from a good being cannot produce a bad will; that
it must be an evil influence-what the law denominates an undue influence -to produce such a result. It is impossible that a good spirit, by
any direct agency or influence, should be the author of evil."
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And when we add to this the other fact that there is not a
reported case in the annals of criminal law in which such
pretences have not been held to be either a fraud or a false
pretence,' there would seem to be but little room for doubt
that, in the eye of the law at least, all these pretences are,
or should be regarded as being false and a fraud on those
who suffer themselves to be deluded into believing them
and acting on that belief. It is difficult to understand why
the civil courts should hold a different doctrine on this
point from that which is held in the criminal courts, especially as the latter should be, if anything, the more lenient
in their treatment of these matters. The fact that a different view is taken by the two branches of the judiciary is
an anomaly, and one that ought to be corrected; and theonly proper way to correct it, in the present light that we
have on the subject, is for the civil courts to adopt the
plain and common-sense rule of the criminal courts and to
hold that all such claims to the possession and exercise of
preternatural power are false, and that a will that owes its
execution to a belief superinduced by these pretences is
procured by the practice of fraud upon the testator, is,
therefore, not his will and should be set aside. There is no
valid objection to be urged against the adoption of such a
rule, and it would remove most of the difficulties that now.
beset this particular branch of the law, facilitate the dealing
out of justice to those who are defrauded of their just expectations by such means, and reduce the chances of doing
injustice to a minimum, since the facts show that, as far as
-our present knowledge goes, the probability of the truth
of these pretences is infinitesimal.
The results of the preceding discussion may be gummarized thus: (I) A belief in spiritualism or in any other
form of the preternatural is not per se an insane delusion;
but it may be one of the evidences of delusion, or may, by
the ascendency it acquires over the mind of the testator,
become or give rise to delusion eventually. (2) That where
any person, whether a spiritual adviser, a professed medium,
114 Crim. L. Mag., i.
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or one who merely fosters or plays upon the superstition of
the testator, while not standing in any confidential relation
to him, procures a testamentary provision for himself or
another person, through the influence of the testator's
belief, or the relation in which he stands to him, the will
will be set aside on the ground of undue influence. (3)
That where the person benefited, or the one who induces
the execution of the will, is a spiritual adviser or medium,
undue influence will be presumed from the relation in which
lie stands to the testator; but where such confidential relation does not exist, undue influence will not be presumed,
but must be affirmatively proved. (4) That it seems to be
the doctrine of the courts that the influence of preternatural
beliefs or of alleged spiritual communications, considered
alone, is not her se an undue influence; but (5)That on
the other hand there seem to be very strong grounds for
holding that it is such an influence, so far at least as spiritualism is concerned, and that, therefore, no will that has for
its inducement spiritualistic communications can be held to
be the will of the testator. (6) That apart from the question of delusion or undue influence there are good reasons
for holding, in analogy to criminal law, that all- alleged
spiritualistic communications and phenomena are false and:
fraudulent, and that a will induced by them is procured by
fraud, and, therefore, is not the will of the testator. It is
claimed in conclusion that the above considerations will be
sufficient to set aside any will induced by preternatural
beliefs that works injustice to the natural and expectant
objects of a testator's bounty, and will do no injustice to
any one; while the rule adopted in some of the cases cited
.above has resulted in manifest injtstice, even to the perception of the Court which, albeit reluctantly, felt itself called
called upon by technical rules to decide as it did.

